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INDIA- NEW ZEALAND TRACK TWO DIALOGUE 
GEOPOLITICAL TRENDS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC INCLUDING MARITIME SECURITY 
 
Geo-political trends point to the decline of the Post-Cold War order 
For several decades Asia Pacific geopolitics has been dominated by the strategic primacy of 
the United States. That is changing. New economic and strategic power centres are emerging. 
China is well on the way to major power status which it feels justifies a major say in the shape 
of a new geopolitical order in the Asia Pacific. India is emerging as a major economic centre 
and military power intent on growing its relations in East Asia.  
China is not yet able to claim superpower status for itself. It is making a significant investment 
in its military, but American military power still far exceeds that  of any other country and US 
defence expenditure is more than the combined total defence expenditures of the next dozen 
or so countries with significant defence budgets. And China is yet to demonstrate the ability 
to form international coalitions to respond to security threats.  
Nevertheless, China’s rising military and economic power and assertive political leadership 
have injected a complex dynamic into the region’s geopolitics. According to the latest IMF 
figures China’s economy when measured by purchasing power parity has surpassed that of 
the United States unseating the latter as the world’s largest economy, a position it had held 
for 142 years. India has moved into third place.  
The United States economy has bounced back from recession, but a highly dysfunctional 
political system, and the absence of a coherent foreign policy characterised by strong 
international leadership that we had come to expect from Washington, have created the 
impression of a superpower in decline. United States influence appears to be waning even 
though there has been no perceptible decline in US power. Republican successes in the 
November elections could accelerate this trend as they will likely intensify rather than heal 
dysfunction and further weaken a beleaguered President’s standing in Asia where he has not 
enjoyed the same popularity as in Europe.  
President Xi Jinping, on the other hand, is China’s strongest ruler since Deng Xiao Ping. He is 
only two years into a likely ten year tenure as head of state. He has been resolute in his 
determination to seek the international respect to which he feels China is now entitled given 
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its economic power, but recognises  that great power status carries international 
expectations of demonstrated  willingness to play a greater role in support of global economic 
stability and security.  
Since Xi Jinping assumed the presidency China has significantly stepped up its UN 
peacekeeping commitments with the decision earlier this year to contribute for the first time 
combat troops to the UN mission in Mali. China is also to commit a 700 strong infantry 
battalion to UN operations in South Sudan. That decision has attracted criticism that it was 
taken to protect China’s oil interests. This has been denied both by China and the UN. There 
may be an element of truth in such commentary, but the same accusations have been 
levelled at the United States in the past for its deployments to the Middle East. It could be 
argued therefore that China was following American practice. 
China has continued its six year-long counter-piracy role in the Indian Ocean, and contributed 
PLA Navy ships in support of the destruction of Syria’s nuclear weapons. The PLA is 
increasingly active in its engagement with foreign forces, not just those in the Asia Pacific. 
China has also contributed medical teams to three African countries ravaged by Ebola.  
Those are positive developments, but Xi Jinping’s tenure is also notable for a growing regional 
assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea where China seems set on making its ten 
dash line a fait accompli, and in the East Sea where tensions have risen over the contested 
claims for Senkaku/Diaoyu. China’s and United States’ security interests collide in both seas 
and the US worries about China’s development of anti-access/area denial capabilities. China 
is also increasingly projecting naval power into the Indian Ocean as demonstrated by the 
temporary addition of a submarine to its counter-piracy task force. Claims that China is 
exploring basing opportunities there is causing alarm in India. 
China’s ambition for new regional security architecture arrangements is underlined by Xi 
Jinping’s proposal for the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures 
known as CICA (launched back in 1992) to be transformed into a “new regional security 
cooperation architecture”. China proposes taking a leading role in developing a “code of 
conduct for regional security and an Asia security partnership program” to provide “Asian 
solutions to Asian problems”.  
In doing so China’s President took direct aim at what he termed an outdated Cold War 
alliance system aimed at a “third party”. Such a system, he asserted, is not “conducive to 
common regional security”. Just as there is no role for China in the US alliance system so 
there would be no role for the US in a strengthened CICA. China holds the chair of CICA for 
the next two years, and will no doubt want to pursue its vision during that term. China’s 
desire to play a lead role in a new regional order should not surprise given that both the Cold 
War order and the post-Cold War order were largely western constructs, developed well 
before China’s rise and Asia’s economic transformation. Xi Jinping followed his call for a new 
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Asian system of regional security with an undertaking at the Communist Party’s end 
November foreign affairs conference to forge a new global network of partnerships.  
While not officially acknowledged by Washington, the US pivot to Asia is largely a response to 
China’s rise. As originally conceived by then Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, the pivot was to 
set a strategic course that would harness Asia’s growth and dynamism to provide 
unprecedented opportunities for the United States for investment, trade and access to 
technology, while ensuring the ability to play a lead role in regional security and prosperity.  
But the pivot or rebalancing as the US now prefers to call it, came under attack in Beijing 
where it was seen as a policy of containment that reflected a desire to maintain the status 
quo ante. Washington insists otherwise, but the pivot’s defence-heavy implementation 
exacerbated Beijing’s suspicions.  
US alliance relationships, in particular those with Japan and the Philippines both of which 
have tense relations with China over contested territory, have been boosted. Washington is 
also strengthened defence relationships with a number of other regional countries, especially 
Vietnam which has persuaded the US to ease its ban on the sale of combat equipment.   
In contrast, however, other key elements of rebalancing have languished at a time when 
economic power trumps military power as the predominant influence in the region. US 
diplomatic staffing in the region and aid levels have flat-lined.  President Obama could not 
convince his own party to agree to “fast-track authority” for the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement which the pivot promoted as a major contribution to Asia-Pacific economic 
integration. Given their greater affinity with free trade arrangements the electoral success of 
the Republicans may help here, but will they be magnanimous enough to give President 
Obama a victory of any sort?  
Rebalancing has been welcomed by the US’s treaty partners, and for the most part by the 
ASEAN countries. There is nonetheless growing scepticism in the region even among close US 
allies about Washington’s ability to deliver given current and planned budget cuts which will 
have a pronounced impact on the Navy in particular, evident for instance in the likelihood of 
the USN being unable to deploy a single aircraft carrier to the region for one-third of 2015, 
and a planned reduction in the size of the USN fleet. 
Several senior US defence officials are already on record this year expressing concern that 
there are significant capability shortfalls for the missions they are expected to undertake. By 
contrast the most recent annual report to Congress by the US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission estimated that the Chinese navy could be larger than its US counterpart 
by 2020. The report concludes that “the balance of power and presence in the region is 
shifting in China’s direction”.  
Regional scepticism will likely be reinforced now that the US is being unwillingly dragged back 
into yet another Middle East war, and risks being caught in the vortex of the Sunni-Shia divide. 
Yet the pivot was supposedly an acknowledgement that its Middle East preoccupations had 
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led the US to pay less attention to the Asia Pacific despite the centrality of its interests in the 
region.  
Nor is it all plain sailing for some US treaty relationships. Washington must manage fractious 
relations between its two key allies Japan and South Korea, and will also be hoping that 
neither Japan nor the Philippines provoke an incident with China in the expectation that the 
US will intervene. In the longer term lurks an even larger issue should events lead to a 
unification of the Korean Peninsula. With its primary security threat removed and a 
comfortable relationship with China in place, Korea’s main security preoccupation will be with 
Japan and that would raise questions over the purpose of US forces on the peninsula.  
China has now joined the US as a mainstay of the international system. A stable and wherever 
possible cooperative relationship between China and the US is therefore fundamental not 
only to peace in the wider Asia-Pacific and beyond, but to the region’s continued economic 
prosperity. There will be no immunity to the fall-out from conflict between them. Regional 
countries would face a choice that very few would wish to make.  
For a range of reasons both countries need to cooperate with each other. But cooperation is 
hampered by distrust on both sides. In 2013 President Obama and President Xi Jinping agreed 
an opportunity existed to create a new model for the relationship. Since then Washington 
appears to have backed away from this Chinese formulation. 
As perceived in Beijing the new model would emphasise mutual respect for its “core 
interests”. That would require the US to adjust its presence, policies and military activities in 
the Western Pacific. The US counters that its military presence and alliance relationships have 
bought peace and stability for the last six-plus decades which had enabled the region to 
prosper economically.  
Despite this distrust, however China and the US demonstrated at APEC that they can work 
together on urgent global challenges when they reached agreement on a joint climate-change 
commitment to curb global warning. From a security viewpoint equally important were 
agreements reached on rules of behaviour for military sea and air encounters and on 
measures designed to avert military confrontations in Asia. It is in the region’s interests that 
Asia Pacific countries encourage similar cooperative endeavours to build a habit of 
cooperation which over time would encourage the two countries to talk to each other rather 
than past each other on key security issues.  
Others are rebalancing too 
Under Putin, Russia, like China, has embarked on a muscular posture supported by a more 
professional and better-equipped military. Over the past decade Russia has doubled its 
defence spending and had planned a further substantial increase this year, although spending 
levels are still considerably lower than during the Cold War. After an absence of many years, 
Russia’s Navy is once again active in the North Pacific.  
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Russia’s closer relationship with China has raised concerns in the West, but mutual suspicion 
over each other’s intentions is never far from the surface as was evident in President Putin’s 
irritation over the joint China-US climate change commitment at APEC. Hampered by a 
deteriorating economy, a problem largely of its own making which will necessitate a revision 
of defence spending plans, Russia holds few cards in the relationship, and lacks the range of 
strategic options available to China. 
Japan has responded to China’s rise by significantly revamping defence policy to cast aside 
some of the constraints imposed on defence activities overseas and its self-imposed ban on 
military exports. The removal of geographical limitations on the activities of its Self Defence 
Force is a major development for Japan. The new defence posture will likely be captured in 
revised Japan-US defence guidelines, but this will reinforce Beijing’s paranoia about 
containment.  
The new geopolitical complexities have seen the development of new security relationships 
as well as the reinforcement of existing ones. Japan has been active in ramping up its 
relations with many of the ASEAN countries including by placing an emphasis on assistance to 
strengthen maritime surveillance and offshore protection capabilities. 
India has signalled its intention to strengthen its relations with the members of ASEAN with 
its announcement of an “Act East” policy, a significant enhancement of its “Look East” 
predecessor. Like Japan, India has identified the development of maritime capabilities as an 
area in which it can provide needed assistance. India is well-placed to further strengthen its 
relations in the region, and take a more active role in the regional forums that seek to build 
the habit of cooperation. That would provide opportunities for India and New Zealand to 
work together where our interests coincide. Closer to home India has embarked on the 
development of civil and military infrastructure along its often troubled land border with 
China.  
Concerns over China’s more muscular interventions in the South China Sea, glacial progress in 
implementing the Declaration of Conduct, and the strong headwinds facing forward 
movement on the Code of Conduct, have led to greater ASEAN receptivity to external 
assistance. Another feature of collective regional insecurity is the rapid development of 
military capabilities by many of the ASEAN’s particularly in the maritime domain, notably 
involving sub-surface elements. This swift build-up of sophisticated capabilities increases the 
risks of conflict if miscalculation occurs and calls for greater regional efforts to adopt 
mitigation measures, an objective on which India and New Zealand could work together.   
The more uncertain geopolitical situation has also prompted ASEAN to strengthen the 
Association’s resilience through the drive to achieve a political and security community. It was 
also a factor in the earlier than expected establishment of the ASEAN Defence Ministers plus 
forum that includes both China and the US and which focusses on developing habits of 
practical defence cooperation in non-contentious fields. This is one of the most significant 
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developments in the regional security architecture in recent years. India and New Zealand are 
both members and there is the opportunity to work together to achieve the objectives set for 
this important forum.  
Economic integration and growing interdependence 
Just as China has a central role in the evolution and resolution of Asia Pacific security issues so 
is it central to the various regional processes of economic integration. Some of these 
processes highlight the divide between China and the US. A number of China’s initiatives 
while welcome in much of the Asia Pacific region, pose a challenge to the ideas behind the US 
pivot.  
China’s support for the decision to expand membership of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (which excludes the US) to include India and Pakistan has both regional security 
and economic integration objectives. China also played a key role in setting up the New 
Development Bank which involves the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa) and has an initial capital of US$50 billion. 
The ‘Silk Road Economic Belt” initiative bolstered by a US$ 40 billion Silk Road fund seeks to 
build on growing trade between western China and central Asia and to connect parts of South 
Asia with Europe, by improving infrastructure linkages across the region. There is a 
companion Maritime Silk Road concept that would boost China’s trade and economic ties 
with ASEAN and Indian Ocean states. China’s two-way trade with ASEAN is already very close 
to US$500 billion (two and half times greater than ASEAN-US two-way trade). The agreed goal 
is to double this figure to US$1 trillion by 2020. 
The Maritime Silk Road concept also includes the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure 
Development Bank (AIDB). Twenty countries have signed up including India, which will be the 
second largest shareholder, and nine members of ASEAN. The AIDB highlights East-West 
leadership cleavages. Washington sees it as a challenge to the US-led IMF and World Bank, 
and has attempted to pressure Australia (apparently unsuccessfully) and South Korea not to 
join. Japan has also lobbied Australia as it considers the AIDB to be a challenge to the 
Japanese-led Asian Development Bank. 
But would China have established the AIDB if the US Congress had not for the last four years 
blocked an increase in China’s voting power in the International Monetary Fund? In 
continuing to limit the voting power in the IMF of the largest economy in the world measured 
by purchasing power parity to the derisory level of just four percent, the US effectively invited 
China to establish an Asian bank, and the US Congress demonstrated its failure to recognise 
the new global realities.   
China is actively engaged in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership negotiations 
which would liberalise regional trade, but is currently excluded from the US-led TPP 
negotiations. It has now signalled its interest in participating in the TPP, and in a deft and 
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creative piece of diplomacy successfully pushed at APEC to revive the concept of a Free Trade 
Area for the Asia Pacific that would amalgamate the two regional free trade pathways.  
Beijing is also about to conclude a FTA with the ROK which has much greater potential than 
the FTA Seoul recently signed with Washington, and which will create the largest economic 
block in Asia. 
The initiatives to strengthen regional economic integration underline Xi Jinping’s 
determination to demonstrate that his “Asia-Pacific dream” does not rest on rhetoric. A set of 
explicit plans and the allocation of substantial resources underpin his vision of a global 
leadership role for China. They also serve to highlight the unbalanced implementation of the 
US pivot and the fact that US pre-eminence in the region is facing headwinds as a lame duck 
President wrestles with a range of challenges that present extremely difficult policy choices. 
Xi Jinping may have also had another motive in mind as the integration impulses and 
processes he is promoting differ from earlier models given their extended supply and value 
chains. This will have the effect of making conflict more problematic.  
While China is rapidly expanding its global reach, domestic issues are likely to loom larger in 
the years ahead. The price of stellar economic growth is serious environmental problems and 
growing inequality. Will a rising middle class remain satisfied with the realisation of its 
economic aspirations or broaden those aspirations to include the ability to choose its leaders, 
taking their lead from recent events in Hong Kong? How China’s leadership tackles these 
issues will have significant bearing on its future place in, and ability to influence events on, 
the global and regional stage.  
Maritime Security 
The tensions referred to earlier in this paper in the South China and East Seas underline the 
importance of moving ahead with measures that will make the maritime commons more 
secure. India and New Zealand share a vital interest in this outcome. The recent adoption by 
the Western Pacific Naval Symposium of the Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea is a useful 
start embracing as it does some of the principles of earlier bilateral incidents-at-sea 
agreements.  
But there is scope to do much more. Incident prevention and mitigation could be improved by 
the development of bilateral and multilateral hotlines, including at the operational level 
between Navies and Coast Guards, with the aim of preventing a minor incident from 
escalating into something more serious.  
There has been some recent progress in establishing bilateral hotlines, for instance between 
China and Vietnam to resolve fishing incidents and the Coast Guard hotline between the 
Philippines and Vietnam intended to share information on incidents at sea and on a range of 
trans-national crimes. More such hotlines are needed.  
Improvements to regional maritime domain awareness are also necessary. The establishment 
of the International Fusion Centre at Changi, Singapore, was an important step forward in 
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promoting collective awareness of trans-boundary maritime security threats The Centre was 
established to serve as a regional maritime information hub, to enhance maritime situational 
awareness, and to act as an early warning system. India and New Zealand both contribute 
liaison officers to the Centre.  
Also headquartered in Singapore is the Regional Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships in Asia known as ReCAAP. Its information sharing centre promotes 
information sharing and capacity building arrangements to strengthen regional cooperation 
in combatting piracy and armed robbery. ReCAAP and the Changi centre now work closely 
together. The challenge, however, is to broaden the mandate of these Centres to encompass 
all trans-national maritime crimes and to develop multilateral arrangements that can meet 
trans-boundary challenges while preserving national sovereignty, and to establish 
mechanisms for the security of the numerous offshore oil and gas installations in the region.  
One idea is coordinated patrolling. India is already leading the way in this regard with joint 
patrols with Thailand and with Indonesia, the latter along the maritime boundaries of the 
Andaman and Nicobar islands. Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand conduct 
coordinated sea and air patrols of the key Malacca Strait waterway.  
New Zealand currently co-chairs the ASEAN Defence Ministers plus forum’s expert working 
group on maritime security and could work with India and others to consider the prospects 
for wider coordinated patrolling in the region. India and New Zealand also participate in the 
Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum where there are opportunities to work together to 
strengthen maritime security cooperation.  
The rise of non-state actors 
A geopolitical trend causing growing concern is the rise of non-state actors or would-be state 
actors. Trans-national criminal and terrorist activities are challenging conventional responses 
to security problems. The ever increasing sophistication of military technology provides few 
answers to Islamic jihadists’ skilful but brutal use of asymmetric warfare, suggesting that a 
wider range of policy options needs to be brought into play rather than reliance on military 
means alone. Moreover, recent military interventions in Iraq and Libya while appearing 
initially to be successful have created a wider set of problems that are proving just as difficult 
to resolve.  
The 21st century has been notable for the almost continuous need in the Indian Ocean for the 
costly deployment of naval forces to prevent passage at sea by Islamic terrorists and to 
counter piracy. India and New Zealand both participate in this mission. Coalition counter-
piracy missions have had some success in suppressing this activity around the Horn of Africa, 
but any linkage between Islamic State and Al-Shahab, would raise more serious concerns in 
respect of this vitally important strategic seaway. Islamic State has already established a 
presence in the Sinai Peninsula and has identified “ungoverned areas” as in Libya as fertile 
soil for its expansion. Somalia could present another opportunity. The welcome reduction at 
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least for now in piracy in the north-west Indian Ocean has been offset by an escalation of 
such incidents off the west coast of Africa and a resurgence in piracy and robbery-at-sea in 
the South China Sea.  
Climate change  
One of the most disconcerting longer-term trends is climate change and its accompanying 
food and water shortages. The most recent US National Intelligence Strategy commented 
“many governments will face challenges to meet even the basic needs of their people as they 
confront demographic change, resource constraints, effects of climate change, and risks of 
global infectious disease outbreaks”. The US Defence Department added climate change to 
the list of threats facing the US in its 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review.   
The scramble to take advantage of the potential for resource extraction as the Arctic ice cap 
melts is another consequence of climate change. It will lead inevitably to the further 
militarisation of the Arctic. Further south some Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean countries face 
sea water inundation and at least one of our South Pacific neighbours could disappear 
entirely, and another faces crop devastation from rising seawater.  
Cyber-security 
Cyber threats both state-sponsored and those generated by criminal enterprises are an 
increasing threat to the security of governments and legitimate commercial activity. Critical 
infrastructure such as banking, finance, communications, transport and energy are key 
targets and are vulnerable to cyber threats unless adequately protected. Criminal groups 
indulging in cyber-crime are often well-funded and well-organised. Some have connections 
with terrorist groups which seek not only to finance their activities through cyber-crime, but 
also to entice recruits. This threat is here to stay and requires not only national vigilance in 
responding to new cyber-crime initiatives, but also regional and global responses.   
South Pacific 
While geographically remote from the major power centres, the South Pacific is not immune 
from the geopolitical trends outlined in this paper. Aside from the potential impact of climate 
change in the South Pacific mentioned above, recent attention has focussed on China’s 
presence in the region. That presence is part of a long term strategy of Chinese diplomacy. 
Until a few years ago there was legitimate concern over the rivalry between China and 
Taiwan for the affections of South Pacific states as this was undermining already fragile 
governance, and was the subject of regular representations in Beijing by both NZ and 
Australia. A welcome agreement between Beijing and Taipei brought this to an end and there 
has been no recent interference from either country in the political affairs of the island states.  
China is a generous provider of aid to the region, but at a level that remains well below that 
of Australia. The most recent figures available place China as the fifth largest aid provider 
after Australia, the EU, New Zealand and Japan. Chinese aid is highly visible but often not 
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well-targeted. Both New Zealand and Australia are now undertaking joint aid projects with 
China in the region. China provides limited defence aid to the three South Pacific states that 
maintain defence forces, but has refrained from providing any form of lethal assistance.  
Political leaders and key officials are regular recipients of invitations to visit China. China’s 
presence in the South Pacific has prompted the US to take more interest in the region, but 
budgetary pressures are likely to limit its role. There is, however, a degree of competition 
between China and Japan for influence, and South Korea now holds an annual meeting with 
South Pacific foreign ministers. China is also a significant provider of soft concessional loans 
which has caused serious difficulties for Tonga whose appetite for such superficially attractive 
loans has created a serious debt burden. Chinese companies are active in PNG in the resource 
extraction business.  
While New Zealand has not been concerned at the level of Chinese engagement in the South 
Pacific, a recent deal signed by Kiribati with China (and interestingly Taiwan), has given those 
countries almost exclusive rights to fish for skipjack tuna in the Kiribati EEZ. This is a 
significant development as the far-flung nature of Kiribati generates a huge EEZ of almost 3.5 
million square kilometres. It is the largest tuna fishery globally. In this year’s access 
negotiations the US had agreed to a substantial increase to US$90 million for annual access to 
the fishery. The figure agreed with China and Taiwan has not been disclosed. Both American 
and New Zealand fishing companies will now have very limited access to this key fishery. 
Finally mention should be made of PM Modi’s and President Xi Jinping’s visits to the South 
Pacific in November 2014 reflecting a new development in the competition for geopolitical 
influence in the region. Both had separate summits with 13 South Pacific nations. This is the 
first South Pacific summit in which an Indian Prime Minister has participated.  The interest 
shown by India in the South Pacific is very welcome. Given the emphasis at that summit on 
development cooperation, there may be opportunities for India and New Zealand to work 
together in the region, just as we are now doing in the Cook Islands with China.  
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